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Abstract
How do scientific models represent in a way that enables us to discover new truths about reality and draw inferences about 
it? Contemporary accounts of scientific discovery answer this question by focusing on the cognitive mechanisms involved 
in the generation of new ideas and concepts in terms of a special sort of reasoning—or model-based reasoning—involving 
imagery. Alternatively, I argue that answering this question requires that we recognise the crucial role of the propositional 
imagination in the construction and development of models for the purpose of generating hypotheses that are plausible can-
didates for truth. I propose simple fictionalism as a new account of models as Waltonian games of make-believe and suggest 
that models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they are used as representations that denote real world phenomena 
and generate two main kinds of theoretical hypotheses, model-world comparisons and direct attributions.
Keywords Scientific discovery · Scientific models · Scientific representation · Model-based reasoning · Make-believe · 
Fictionalism · Denotation · Theoretical hypotheses
1 Introduction
How do scientific models represent real world phenomena in 
ways that enable scientific discovery and inferences? In this 
paper I will argue that answering this question requires rec-
ognising the crucial role of the scientific imagination in the 
construction and development of models for the purpose of 
generating hypotheses that are plausible candidates for truth.
Imagination is integral to the ways in which contempo-
rary scientific investigation enables scientific discovery and 
thereby produces new knowledge of reality. When scientists 
want to study a particular aspect of the world that is too 
complex to study directly they imagine a version of that 
system with simplifications and alterations, i.e. they study a 
scientific model. For example, the Lotka–Volterra model of 
predator–prey interaction is commonly identified with the 
following two differential equations:
The equations model the growth rates of two imaginary 
populations, one prey and one predator, dynamically inter-
acting with each other. However, the equations per se do not 
model anything unless they are used under a certain con-
strual. The variables x and y in the equations are construed 
as standing in for prey and predator population respectively, 
t for time, A for the growth rate of prey, B for the preda-
tion rate coefficient, C for the predator mortality rate, and 
D for the rate at which predators increase by consuming 
prey. To enable mathematical treatment, the model makes 
a number of simplifying assumptions, including that prey 
have limitless supplies of food, that predators have infinite 
appetite, and that the environment never changes. Of course, 
each of these assumptions is false! The model describes two 
imaginary populations interacting with each other under 
imaginary conditions. Furthermore, the model enables the 
generation of certain hypotheses about the dynamic interac-
tion of the imaginary prey and predator populations. The 
model predicts that the dynamic interaction between imagi-
nary predators and prey will show a cyclical relationship in 
their numbers, and that the rates of increase and decrease 
of the predator population size generally tracks the rates of 
increase and decrease of the prey population size. These 
predictions can then be transferred onto reality through the 
generation of hypotheses that are about real predators and 
dx∕dt = Ax − Bxy
dy∕dt = −Cy + Dxy
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prey. Imagination thus seems to be vital both to the construc-
tion and development of the model and to the generation of 
its outcomes.
The traditional distinction between context of discovery 
and context of justification championed in different ways 
by Reichenbach (1938) and Popper (1961) undervalued the 
epistemic role of imagination. On this view, in the context 
of discovery we get ideas and formulate hypotheses, no 
matter how—dreams, reveries and any unconstrained uses 
of imagination will do. In the context of justification, we 
gather evidence from reality to assess scientific hypotheses 
and thereby gain knowledge. The context of justification is 
properly characterised as epistemic, i.e. it relates to knowl-
edge. Epistemic standards—or standards of knowledge—do 
not apply to the context of discovery. They apply only to the 
context of justification. Imagination falls within the con-
text of discovery and is therefore irrelevant to the context 
of justification.
The traditional distinction between discovery and justi-
fication has been challenged over the past few decades by 
upholders of deductive, evolutionary and cognitive theories 
of discovery (for a critical review see Ippoliti 2017, 2018). 
Deductive theories posit that there is a logic of discovery 
and that this is deductive logic (Dummett 1991; Hintikka 
1973; Musgrave 1989); evolutionary theories claim that new 
ideas and hypotheses are formed through an evolutionary 
process of blind variation and selective retention (Campbell 
1960; Hull 1988; Nickles 2009); cognitive theories hold that 
discovery is brought about by certain cognitive processes 
involved in ordinary problem-solving activities and heuristic 
reasoning (Simon and Newell 1971; Simon 1977). Deduc-
tive and evolutionary theories do not analyse the key role 
of imagination in the generation of new hypotheses about 
reality. But Magnani (2009) and Nersessian (2008, 2009) 
recently developed cognitive theories according to which 
conceptual change and innovation in science are achieved 
through a particular type of reasoning—or model-based 
reasoning—which involves imagery. These cognitive theo-
ries based on mode-based reasoning focus on the cognitive 
operations performed on imagistic representations that, as I 
will argue below, are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
generation of new hypotheses in scientific models.
My aim in this paper is to sketch a novel understand-
ing of how scientific models enable the generation of new 
hypotheses through the scientific imagination. I identify 
make-believe as a variety of constrained imagination that 
is crucial to the construction and development of models. 
Make-believe emerges as a specific theoretical notion within 
Walton’s (1990) theory of fiction and it has been deployed 
in contemporary fictionalist accounts of models as represen-
tation (Frigg 2010; Toon 2012). However, I will not have 
space to discuss these accounts here. Instead, I will present 
my own view, what I call simple fictionalism. Following 
Salis and Frigg (forthcoming), I will construe make-believe 
as a social imaginative activity involving propositional 
imagination. I will then argue that models enable scientific 
discovery when they stand in a referential relation with real 
world phenomena and when they generate two main kinds 
of theoretical hypotheses about reality, model-world com-
parisons and direct attributions.
In what follows, I will critically assess Magnani’s (2009) 
and Nersessian’s (2008, 2009) cognitive accounts of scien-
tific discovery (Sect. 2). I will sketch an account of models 
as make-believe based on Walton’s (1990) theory and Salis 
and Frigg’s (forthcoming) interpretation (Sect. 3). And I 
will advance simple fictionalism as an alternative account 
of model-based discovery (Sect. 4).
2  Scientific Innovation Through 
Model‑Based Reasoning
In a series of works published since 1988, Nancy Nerses-
sian developed a sophisticated and influential account of 
conceptual change and innovation in science. Her starting 
point is the distinction between two main types of mental 
representations, imagistic representations and linguistic 
and formulaic representations, enabling two distinct types 
of reasoning, model-based reasoning and sentential rea-
soning. Linguistic and formulaic representations enable 
sentential reasoning, i.e. logical and mathematical opera-
tions that are rule based and truth preserving. These repre-
sentations ‘are interpreted as referring to physical objects, 
structures, processes, or events descriptively’ (Nersessian 
2007, p. 132). Their relationship to what they refer to ‘is 
truth, and thus the representation is evaluated as being true 
or false’ (ibid., 132). Imagistic representations—what she 
calls ‘iconic representations’ or ‘mental models’—enable 
model-based reasoning, including problem solving, analogi-
cal reasoning, mental simulation, probabilistic reasoning and 
causal reasoning. Iconic representations ‘are interpreted as 
representing demonstratively’ (ibid., 132). Their relation-
ship to what they represent ‘is similarity or goodness of fit 
[…] and [they] are thus evaluated as accurate or inaccurate’ 
(ibid., 132). Mental models are analogues of real world phe-
nomena. They are cognitive constructs that represent real 
phenomena as conceptual structures composed of imagistic 
symbols (iconic representations). Nersessian (2009) further 
identifies three specific forms of model-based reasoning, 
i.e. analogical modelling, visual modelling and simulative 
modelling (or thought experimenting). On her view, the gen-
eration of new ideas and hypotheses is explained in terms 
of model-based reasoning that enables the construction of 
new mental models under domain-specific constraints and 
through various forms of abstraction.
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Partially inspired by this work, Magnani (2009) 
explains the process of forming new hypotheses in terms 
of the notion of model-based abduction that he distin-
guishes from sentential abduction. The notion of abduc-
tion was originally introduced by Peirce (1932/1963) as 
a form of inference that is distinct from deductive and 
inductive inference. More specifically, abductive inference 
is the process of generating an explanatory hypothesis. 
Magnani further elaborates this view through what he 
calls the Select and Test model. On this model, abduction 
generates a novel hypothesis that is a plausible candidate 
for being the best explanation of a certain phenomenon; 
deduction draws the consequences of the hypothesis 
in terms of logical implication; induction assesses the 
hypothesis on the basis of whether its consequences hold 
via comparisons with the facts. Sentential abduction gen-
erates explanations constituted by linguistic symbols (e.g. 
sentences of a logical language, neural and probabilistic 
frameworks) that enable deductive reasoning through 
logical implications. Model-based abduction operates on 
imagistic symbols (perceptual, diagrammatic, mnemonic) 
that enable analogical reasoning and simulative reasoning 
akin to Nersessian’s simulative model-based reasoning. In 
sentential abduction a hypothesis is chosen from a finite 
set of a theory’s entailments. In model-based abduction a 
hypothesis is formed as genuinely new. On this view, the 
generation of new hypotheses is best explained in terms 
of model-based abduction.
Both Nersessian and Magnani argue that mental models 
are imagistic representations. However, I doubt that imagery 
is either necessary or sufficient for the generation of new 
hypotheses in scientific models. Let me start by explaining 
why I think that mental images are not necessary. Our abili-
ties to form mental images and perform the relevant kinds of 
cognitive operations are highly subjective and idiosyncratic. 
Yet, individuals with poor imagistic abilities are obviously 
not prevented from deriving model outcomes. Consider 
again the Lotka–Volterra model. No mental images are 
required to grasp the model’s theoretical and mathematical 
background, to develop the equations and assign the relevant 
values to their variables. No mental images are required to 
grasp the mathematical constraints operating on the equa-
tions. No mental images are required to generate the hypoth-
esis that imaginary predators and prey interact in a cyclical 
way. Of course, the results of the equations can be graphi-
cally represented with a diagram that facilitates a scientist’s 
reasoning by making it more vivid. However, this is far from 
being necessary. One can form the hypothesis that predators 
and prey interact in a cyclical way by grasping the proposi-
tional content of the model description and by deploying the 
mathematical and theoretical principles that are relevant for 
this specific domain of enquiry. Model-based reasoning as 
the sort of reasoning that would be enabled exclusively by 
imagistic representations therefore seems unnecessary for 
the generation of hypotheses in scientific models.
Second, I doubt that images are sufficient to draw model 
outcomes. Consider again the Lotka–Volterra model. We 
don’t have an image of a prey population with infinite sup-
plies of food or of a predator population with limitless 
appetite. For what sort of mental images would these be? 
Likewise, we cannot form an imagistic representation of the 
concept of dynamic interaction without having a theoretical 
definition, which is usually given in linguistic and formulaic 
symbols. What we really need to develop the model and 
derive its outcomes are theoretical knowledge of general 
mathematical principles and laws, mathematical abilities, 
and logical inferential abilities. We could not even begin to 
reason about the model and its domain of enquiry without 
the relevant theoretical, mathematical, and logical abili-
ties. So, it is not surprising that when talking about similar 
issues in the practice of thought experimenting, Nersessian 
admits that ‘[i]nformation deriving from various represen-
tational formats, including language and mathematics, plays 
a role’ (2007, p. 147). On her view, this form of sentential 
and mathematical reasoning is fundamentally different from 
model-based reasoning. But it is difficult to see how this 
fits into a view that places imagistic representations at the 
heart of conceptual change and innovation. Imagistic reason-
ing therefore seems also insufficient for the generation of 
hypotheses in scientific models.
The same considerations apply to Magnani’s (2009) iden-
tification of model-based abduction as the only relevant sort 
of inferential reasoning leading to the generation of novel 
hypotheses. As I stated above, Magnani distinguishes 
between sentential abduction and model-based abduction in 
terms of different types of mental representations enabling 
different types of cognitive operations. Given what I argued 
for in the previous two paragraphs, I doubt that the gen-
eration of new hypotheses can be achieved through model-
based abduction involving the manipulation of imagistic 
representations. More plausibly, sentential and mathematical 
symbols are involved both in the selection of a hypothesis 
among other available hypotheses and in the generation of 
novel hypotheses.
The upshot of this critical discussion is that we need to 
recognise an alternative notion of imagination that can con-
tribute an explanation of the generation of new hypotheses 
in models in terms of the deployment of linguistic and math-
ematical symbols.
3  Models as Games of Make‑Believe
To identify the right kind of imagination involved in the 
generation of hypotheses in models I will take on board a 
taxonomy of varieties of imagination recently developed in 
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Salis and Frigg (forthcoming). Here we distinguish between 
two main kinds of imaginative abilities, objectual imagina-
tion and propositional imagination. Objectual imagination is 
a mental relation to a representation of a (real or non-exist-
ent) object, and further divides into imagery—a relation to 
an imagistic representation—and conceptual imagination—
a relation to a conceptual representation of an object that 
needs not involve any imagistic symbols, e.g. a concept of a 
chiliagon, which is a thousand-sided polygon and therefore 
cannot be visually represented in the mind.
Propositional imagination involves linguistic and formu-
laic symbols and is usually characterised as a mental relation 
to a proposition. We identify three main features of propo-
sitional imagination that emerge from the current literature 
on imagination in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, 
i.e. freedom, mirroring, and quarantining.
Freedom is the feature according to which we can imag-
ine in ways that transcend reality (Currie and Ravenscroft 
2002; Nichols and Stich 2000; Velleman 2000). We can 
imagine that predators have infinite supplies of food, that a 
pendulum bob is a point mass, that economic agents are per-
fectly rational etc. without being committed to the genuine 
truth of any these claims.
Mirroring is the feature according to which propositional 
imagination carries inferential commitments that are similar 
to those carried by belief (Gendler 2003; Leslie 1987; Perner 
1991; Nichols and Stich 2000; Nichols 2004, 2006). We can 
engage in inferential reasoning of different kinds (deductive, 
inductive, abductive) both when we believe that p and when 
we imagine that p. In both cases inferences will depend on 
background information and on the particular purposes of 
our reasoning.
Quarantining is the feature according to which imagin-
ing that p does not entail believing that p and therefore does 
not guide action in the real world (Gendler 2003; Leslie 
1987; Nichols and Stich 2000; Perner 1991). Thus, learning 
through the propositional imagination requires stepping out 
of the imagination by exporting what has been learned in the 
imagination in relevant ways (more on this below).
Propositional imagination divides into supposition, coun-
terfactual reasoning and make-believe. Make-believe fits 
well with the social, normative and objective character of 
imagination in scientific models and artistic fictions and for 
this reason we identify this variety of propositional imagi-
nation as crucial to the construction and development of 
models and to the derivation of their outcomes.
Walton (1990) originally characterises make-believe as an 
imaginative activity involving props and submits that works 
of fiction function as props in games of make-believe. Props 
are ordinary objects that make propositions fictionally true 
in virtue of a prescription to imagine, i.e. a social conven-
tion explicitly stipulated or implicitly understood as being 
in force within a game. Fictional truth—or fictionality—is 
a property of those propositions that are licensed by the pre-
scriptions to imagine of a game (independently of whether 
they are in fact imagined). To call a proposition p fictional 
means that in a certain game F it is to be imagined that p. To 
avoid confusion, I will use the expression ‘f-truth’ to refer 
to fictional truth.
F-truths divide into primary f-truths and implied f-truths. 
Primary f-truths are generated directly from the text of a 
fictional story (the prop). Implied f-truths are generated indi-
rectly from the primary f-truths via principles of generation. 
Walton identifies two main principles of generation, the real-
ity principle, which keeps the world of the fiction as close as 
possible to the real world, and the mutual-belief principle, 
which is directed toward the mutual beliefs of the members 
of the community in which the story originated. Depend-
ing on disciplinary conventions and interpretative practices 
other principles are also possible.
Games of make-believe are authorized when they are 
constrained by the author’s prescriptions to imagine. They 
are unofficial when they are not licensed by an author’s pre-
scriptions to imagine and the rules of generation constrain-
ing them are ad hoc. Furthermore, they can involve imagin-
ings about real objects and fictional objects. But imaginings 
do not have any ontological import and do not commit us to 
postulate any fictional entities. The Waltonian framework is 
therefore compatible with both realism and antirealism about 
fictional entities, but Walton (1990, chap. 10–11) voices his 
preference for antirealism.
When we apply these ideas to scientific models we obtain 
the following picture. Models involve model descriptions—
the props—that prescribe imagining that certain hypothetical 
systems are so and so. Consider, for example, the Lotka–Vol-
terra model of dynamic interaction between predator and 
prey populations. The model is usually identified with the 
two differential equations presented in Sect. 1. The equations 
are the props that prescribe imagining that two hypothetical 
populations dynamically interact with each other accord-
ing to certain mathematical constraints. The first equation 
prescribes imagining the growth of the prey population as 
the rate of increase in prey population ( dx = Ax dt ) propor-
tional to the number of prey, minus the rate at which prey 
are destroyed by predators ( dx = − Bxy dt ). The second 
equation prescribes imagining the growth of the predator 
population as the rate of decrease of the number of predators 
( dy = − Cy dt ) proportional to the number of predators, 
plus the rate at which predators consume prey ( dy = Dxy dt).
As mentioned in the Introduction, the model description 
further prescribes imagining that predators have infinite 
appetite, that prey have limitless supplies of food, that the 
environment in which they interact does not change. We can 
imagine otherwise if we want, for example we can imagine 
that prey have only limited supplies of food, but this is in 
violation of the model’s prescriptions to imagine and thus it 
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is not among its f-truths. The content of the model is there-
fore normatively and objectively determined by the model’s 
initial prescriptions to imagine and by the interpreted math-
ematical principles of the game independently of possible 
subjective idiosyncrasies in the actual imaginings of users 
of the model.
Furthermore, the model is developed by finding out what 
is implicitly true in it or implicitly f-true, which goes beyond 
what is explicitly stated in the original prescriptions to imag-
ine. And this makes it possible that we can discover facts 
in the model—what we may call fictional facts or f-facts—
that enable us to learn about the model and, eventually, 
also about reality. These implicit f-truths can be inferred 
according to certain principles of generation. However, as 
we emphasise in Salis and Frigg (forthcoming), neither the 
reality principle nor the mutual belief principle are privi-
leged in scientific modelling. Scientific models make use 
of different principles that can vary depending on discipli-
nary conventions, interpretative practices and purpose of 
enquiry.1 The Lotka–Volterra model is developed according 
to the mathematical constraints of the two differential equa-
tions to find out the rates of increase and decrease of the size 
of the imaginary prey and predator populations. The model 
predicts that when the number of predators increases ( y ), so 
does the rate at which predators consume prey ( Dxy ), which 
leads to an increase in their number. As a consequence, the 
number of prey (x) decreases, which leads to a decrease in 
the number of predators (y) and the rate at which predators 
consume prey ( Dxy ) also decreases. As the rate at which 
predators consume prey decreases, the number of prey (x) 
increases again, leading to an increase in the number of 
predators (y) starting again the cycle.
In this way we have discovered the mechanisms of 
dynamic interaction of two fictional populations. That is, 
we have discovered certain f-facts pertaining to a fictional 
system. Discovering the rates of increase and decrease in the 
size of real populations interacting with each other requires 
exporting what we have learned in the game of make-believe 
onto reality via the formulation of certain theoretical hypoth-
eses. Specifically, it requires comparing the rates of increase 
and decrease of the size of fictional populations and the rates 
of increase and decrease of the size of real predator and 
prey populations with the aim of testing whether the first 
are shared by the second. Fictional populations do not really 
increase or decrease their size in dynamic interaction with 
each other. That is, they do not really have the sort of prop-
erties that they are supposed to share with real predators 
and prey. So, how can model-world comparisons involving 
apparent reference to fictional populations be true? Answer-
ing this question requires turning to Walton’s analysis of 
fictional discourse, i.e. discourse about fictional characters, 
events and situations. I will come back to this in Sect. 4.
4  Simple Fictionalism
From the current literature on the representational function 
of models emerge two main conditions that a model has to 
satisfy to be a representation of a real system that enables 
knowledge of reality, the aboutness condition (henceforth 
AC) and the epistemic condition (henceforth EC). AC is the 
condition that an object x has to satisfy to be a representa-
tion of a distinct object y. EC is the condition that an object 
x has to satisfy to be an epistemic representation of a distinct 
object y. In this section I will first focus on AC and then on 
EC.
4.1  Aboutness Condition or AC
Contemporary theories of models as representation identify 
denotation as the key to AC. Denotation is a dyadic relation 
between a token of a representational symbol and the par-
ticular or multiple objects it stands in for. Philosophers of 
language have spent a great deal of time developing different 
theories of denotation—or reference (they often use the two 
terms as synonyms). But while they take the nature of denot-
ing symbols to be sufficiently clear not to worry too much 
about it, philosophers of science have spent quite a great deal 
of ink trying to understand the nature of models and what 
kind of objects they really are (see Frigg and Nguyen 2017 
for a review of these different positions).
According to simple fictionalism, a model M is a com-
plex object that is constituted by a model description DM 
and its content CM, so that M = [DM, CM]. Model descrip-
tions are akin to the texts of fictional stories, they are props 
that prescribe imagining certain f-truths. The model con-
tent includes the explicit f-truths prescribed by the model 
description and the implied f-truths generated through the 
principles of generation. The relevant f-truths, as anticipated 
in Sect. 3, are nothing other than the propositions that are 
among the prescriptions to imagine generated by DM. Model 
descriptions typically involve definite or indefinite descrip-
tions and express propositions that are not about any con-
crete object. Simple fictionalism avoids the usual metaphysi-
cal controversies surrounding the nature of fictional entities 
by assuming fictional antirealism. On this view, there are no 
imaginary systems that model descriptions are about.
Nevertheless, model descriptions seem to prescribe imag-
inings about some particular systems. This is one important 
aspect of the phenomenology of models—or what Thomson-
Jones (forthcoming) calls the face-value practice. He notices 
that a model description “has the surface appearance of an 
accurate description of an actual, concrete system (or kind of 
1 See Frigg and Nguyen (2016) for the sort of principles of genera-
tion involved in models.
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system) from the domain of inquiry” (2010, p. 284). But how 
can model descriptions prescribe imaginings about model 
systems if there are no such systems? This is one particular 
instance of the more general problem of the object-direct-
edness—or intentionality—of mental states.
Antirealists about intentionality argue that not every 
mental state that seems to be directed at some object needs 
an object. According to one increasingly popular idea, the 
object-directedness of our imagining is explained in terms 
of the notion of a mental file.2 This notion is deeply rooted 
in our folk psychology and it is akin to the idea of a concept, 
a cognitive particular or a mental representation that stands 
in for an individual object. A mental file is a cognitive struc-
ture for the storage of information that a subject takes to be, 
internally, about one and the same object independently of 
whether the object exists. An architect refurbishing an old 
building will produce a description (including sentences, 
plans, blueprints) containing all sort of information that she 
takes to be about the building. An architect planning to con-
struct a new building will do something very similar and will 
take the information stored in the file to be about one and the 
same building even though this does not yet exist. Similarly, 
the model description of the Lotka–Volterra model involves 
information that one takes to be about certain imaginary 
populations dynamically interacting with each other. The 
descriptive information generated through the prescriptions 
to imagine and the principles of generation is taken to be 
about the same imaginary populations. Of course, there are 
no real entities that this information is really about. So, this 
aboutness relation is not genuine aboutness but merely pre-
tend aboutness. Yet internally, at the level of thought, these 
cases engage the same sort of cognitive resources and there-
fore have the same phenomenology.
Here is another aspect of the phenomenology of models 
that has been at the centre of heated debate.3 Often scien-
tists seem to think and talk about model systems as if they 
were the vehicles of denotation. For example, they say things 
like ‘the imaginary prey population represents the rabbit 
population’, or ‘the imaginary dynamic interaction between 
imaginary predator and prey populations represents the real 
dynamic interaction between foxes and rabbits’. Those who 
have taken this datum at face value have argued that model 
systems really are the vehicles of denotation. To account 
for this intuition, realists postulate that model systems are 
abstract entities that stand in a representation relation with 
real world targets.4 But what can antirealists say?
Antirealists will have to say something like the following. 
Scientists use model descriptions to specify, in the imagina-
tion, an imaginary system having these and these properties. 
Of course, they are merely engaging in pretence and this 
does not commit to the postulation of any imaginary systems 
as bona fide objects. While engaged in the very same pre-
tence scientists also claim that model systems denote targets. 
As stated above, denotation is a relation between a referring 
symbol (the denotans) and an object (its denotatum). Phi-
losophers of language have already focused on cases where 
there is a referring term (e.g. ‘the present king of France’, 
‘Ulysses’) but no object that satisfies the reference-fixing 
condition associated to uses of the term. The problem that 
the antirealist about model systems faces is what I call the 
inverse problem of denotation, where we have a denotatum 
(the target) without denotans (the model system). On this 
antirealist interpretation of model systems, denotation fails 
because there is no vehicle of denotation. It follows that 
denotation between model systems and targets is only pre-
tend denotation and therefore it is not denotation at all.
How can simple fictionalism explain AC coherently with 
antirealism about model systems? Simple fictionalism iden-
tifies the model M—the complex object constituted by the 
model description DM and its content CM—as the vehicle 
of denotation. Scientists construct and develop models in 
pretence just like authors of fiction construct and develop 
fictional stories in pretence. DM do not denote any real tar-
gets just like fictional texts do not denote any real objects. 
Furthermore, they do not prescribe imaginings about any 
real systems, but rather prescribe imaginings about fic-
tional systems without there being any such systems. M, as 
the complex object constituted by DM and CM, however, is 
a bona fide object that can stand in a genuine (rather than 
pretend) denotation with targets. Both DM and CM exist, and 
so the whole model M exists. Model systems, however, don’t 
exist—just like the fictional characters described in fictional 
stories don’t exist. Indeed, they are not part of the model at 
all. The intuition that model descriptions prescribe imag-
ining propositions that seem to be about some particular 
model systems can be explained in terms of the deployment 
of mental files for the storage of information that they take 
to be about some particular object independently of whether 
the object exists or not. Mental files, however, are associated 
to the model without being part of it. Since both DM and 
CM exist, there can be genuine denotation relation between 
M and real target systems.
2 Friend (2011, 2014) appeals to mental files to explain the phenom-
enon of intersubjective identification of fictional characters within 
an antirealist framework. Intersubjective identification of the same 
object, or co-identification, is further explained in terms of participa-
tion in the same information network (Friend 2011, 2014) or the same 
name-using practice (Salis 2013) which support the mental files.
3 See the current dispute between upholders of the so-called indirect 
fiction view (Frigg 2010) and the direct fiction view (Toon 2012) of 
models.
4 See, e.g., Giere (1988, 2004) and more recently Thomasson (forth-
coming) and Thomson-Jones (forthcoming) for a defence of this view.
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4.2  Epistemic Condition, or EC
Now let us move to EC, which is the real key to the problem 
of how models enable scientific discovery and knowledge 
of reality. Simple fictionalism can contribute an explana-
tion of EC in terms of the generation of two main kinds of 
theoretical hypotheses about reality, comparative statements 
and direct attributions. It is through these testable hypoth-
eses that models can enable genuine scientific discovery and 
inferences about reality. Let us start from model-world com-
parisons. Fictional objects do not have the sort of properties 
that they are supposed to share with real objects. So, how 
can model-world comparisons involving apparent reference 
to fictional objects be true? Answering this question requires 
turning to Walton’s analysis of fictional discourse.5
When considering the Lotka–Volterra model of dynamic 
interaction between two populations we can say things like:
1. The prey population has unlimited supplies of food.
  This can be interpreted in two different ways, as an 
instance of intra-fictional discourse that we perform from 
a perspective that is internal to the imagined context of 
the model or as an instance of meta-fictional discourse 
that we perform from a perspective that is external to the 
imagined context of the model. On the first interpretation, 
utterances of (1) are assertions (or pseudo-assertions) 
that are only f-true and the propositional attitude we have 
toward their content is imagination. On the second inter-
pretation, utterances of (1) are genuine assertions that can 
be evaluated for genuine truth and the propositional atti-
tude we have toward their content is belief. In this case, 
we need to read (1) as implicitly prefixed by an operator 
MLV quantifying over the Lotka–Volterra model that is 
akin to Walton’s (1990, 396 ff.) fictional operator:
2. According to MLV, the prey population has unlimited 
supplies of food.
  The proposition that ‘according to MLV, the prey popu-
lation has unlimited supplies of food’ (a general propo-
sition that does not involve reference to any concrete 
population) is true even though there is no fictional prey 
population.6
  We can claim to know things about the imaginary pop-
ulations described in the Lotka–Volterra model and the 
ways in which they interact. But what sort of knowledge 
is the one we claim to have in this case? These claims, call 
them KI-claims (where ‘K’ stands in for ‘knowledge’ and 
‘I’ stands in for imagination), involve imagination as the 
relevant mental attitude and they can only be assessed for 
f-truth. As such, they do not fit well with the traditional 
notion of knowledge as justified true belief. Addressing 
this issue requires developing an understanding of the 
epistemic constraints operating on imagination in mod-
els. Here I can only sketch what I believe to be the begin-
ning of the right sort of answer. What makes a particular 
imagining justified is the possession of evidence that is 
provided by the objective f-truths generated by the origi-
nal prescriptions to imagine of the model together with 
the principles of generation. It is this conformity with 
the original prescriptions to imagine and the principles of 
generation that guarantees that a particular imagining is 
the outcome of a reliable epistemic process. We are justi-
fied in imagining that the prey population has unlimited 
supplies of food or that predator and prey dynamically 
interact with each other in cyclical ways if this conforms 
to the prescriptions to imagine of the Lotka–Volterra 
model. In this way, we can explain how these claims can 
be objectively assessed in terms of the notion of f-truth.
  Now consider a comparison between imaginary popu-
lations and real populations:
3. The dynamic interaction of the imaginary predator and 
prey populations is very similar to the dynamic interac-
tion of real foxes and rabbits.
  (3) is literally false (because there is no dynamic inter-
action between imaginary predators and prey). Walton 
(1990, 405 ff.) submits that such utterances should be 
understood as contributions to unofficial games of make-
believe. On the internal reading, an utterance of (3) is 
interpreted within an unofficial game of make-believe 
that includes information about the dynamic interaction 
of imaginary populations and the dynamic interaction 
of real foxes and rabbits. On the external reading, we 
have to appeal to an operator UGLV quantifying over the 
unofficial game of make-believe implied by comparing 
the dynamic interaction of imaginary populations and 
the dynamic interaction of real populations. Call this A1 
for Analysis-1. On this interpretation, (3) is replaced by
4. According to UGLV, the dynamic interaction of the imag-
inary predator and prey populations is very similar to the 
dynamic interaction of foxes and rabbits.
  While (3) is only f-true, (4) can be tested for genuine 
truth. Indeed, (3) has only fictional truth conditions—it 
is f-true in the unofficial game of make-believe—while 
(4) is genuinely true because the unofficial game of 
make-believe is real and (4) simply reports one of its 
prescriptions to imagine. Compare: ‘it is fictional that 
p’ with ‘the game is such that p’.
5 See Salis (2016) for an extensive discussion of Walton’s analysis 
of fictional discourse and model-world comparisons in relation to the 
current literature on models as fiction.
6 Walton rejects this interpretation for statements involving fictional 
names (which according to him express no propositions) and appeals 
instead to an analysis in terms of kinds of pretence. Friend (2011) 
argues that this is insufficient to distinguish different kinds of pre-
tence that seem to be about different fictional objects. She and Salis 
(2013) offer an alternative analysis in terms of gappy propositions. 
Model descriptions, however, do not usually involve proper names. 
So, we should not worry about this particular problem here.
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  Some comparative claims, however, involve reference 
to degrees of properties, rates of increase and decrease 
of properties, and other mathematical entities that can 
be individuated on a scale of measurement:
5. The rate of increase in the size of the fictional prey popu-
lation is very similar to the rate of increase in the size of 
the rabbit population.
  The fictional prey population cannot instantiate any 
increase of size. On the internal reading, an utterance of 
(5) is interpreted as performed within an unofficial game of 
make-believe which includes information about the rates 
of increase of the size of the fictional prey population and 
the rates of increase of the size of the real rabbit popula-
tion. (5), of course, is only f-true. On the external reading, 
we can appeal to quantification over rates of increase of the 
fictional prey population size and the operator MLV quan-
tifying over the Lotka–Volterra model. Call this A2 for 
Analysis-2. On this interpretation, (5) can be construed as:
6. There are some rates of increase in population size, i and 
j, such that i ≅ j, according to MLV the rate of increase of 
the prey population size is i, and the rate of increase of 
the rabbit population size is j.
  (6) is a candidate for genuine truth on the assumption 
that there are certain rates of increase in population size 
i and j standing in a similarity relation, according to the 
Lotka-Volterra model i is instantiated by the (fictional) 
prey population, and j is instantiated by the real rabbit 
population. Of course, i is only fictionally instantiated by 
the imaginary prey population. But the relevant clause 
states that it is according to the model that i is instanti-
ated. That is, the clause is a report of what the model 
prescribes to imagine.
  How is the similarity relation between models and 
reality justified? To address this issue, we need to distin-
guish between generating and assessing a hypothesis as 
a plausible candidate for truth on the basis of evidence 
originated in the game of make-believe and assessing 
the hypothesis for truth and falsity in reality and there-
fore on the basis of empirical evidence. The relevant 
hypotheses become KR-claims (where ‘K’ stands in for 
knowledge and ‘R’ stands in for reality) when they are 
assessed for truth in reality through rigorous and system-
atic procedures of observation and experimentation. I 
may compare the ways in which the fictional populations 
in the Lotka–Volterra model interact with the ways in 
which real predator and prey populations interact. They 
become KR-claims when they are assessed in reality. 
However, comparative claims involve genuine refer-
ence to real world objects and apparent reference to non-
existent objects. Model-world comparisons are therefore 
contributions to unofficial game of make-believe.
  Unofficial games of make-believe raise the same issues 
raised by KI-claims and are amenable to similar solutions. 
One caveat is in order though. The truth-conditions of 
these claims are only partially constrained by the prescrip-
tions to imagine of a certain game, i.e. those concerning 
features of the imaginary objects of the model. Imaginings 
about reality, however, are constrained by reality itself. For 
example, when I compare the ways in which the imagi-
nary populations in the Lotka–Volterra model interact with 
the ways in which real predators and prey interact, I must 
assess the claim with respect to the model prescriptions to 
imagine and with respect to reality. If real populations do 
not behave in similar ways (if they do not instantiate the 
features that they are supposed to share with imaginary 
populations) then the comparative claim will be false.
  Sometimes scientists do not engage in model-world 
comparisons but rather in comparisons between mod-
els, or what I would like to call model–model compari-
sons.7 For example, in some scientific contexts scien-
tists compare models of different degrees of abstraction 
such as data-models and theoretical models about 
black-holes without comparing a model of a black-hole 
and a real black-hole. Depending on the specific sort 
of comparative claim, we could apply analysis A1 or 
A2 to these cases too. However, the similarity relation 
between models would be justified only in terms of the 
prescriptions to imagine in force in the games of make-
believe and in the unofficial games of make-believe 
generated for the specific purposes of these special cir-
cumstances. As such, they raise the same issues raised 
by KI-claims and are amenable to similar solutions.
  Finally, scientists can also select and export informa-
tion about the model system as testable hypotheses about 
the target when they directly attribute imagined proper-
ties of the fictional system to the target. So, for example, 
they can say things like:
7. The rates of increase and decrease of the real predator 
population size tracks the rates of increase and decrease 
of the size of the real prey population.
  (7) is not a comparison but a direct attribution of 
a property of the fictional system (rates of increase 
and decrease of population size) to the real predators 
and prey. The generation of this kind of theoretical 
hypotheses can be explained in terms of interpretation 
keys converting facts about model systems into claims 
about targets.8 When the relevant key is identity the 
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this different type 
of comparison.
8 Interpretation keys have been presented originally by Frigg (2010). 
On his view, model systems are analogous to maps that allow infer-
ring facts about a certain territory from facts about the map and an 
interpretation key translating facts about the map into claims about 
the territory. See Salis (2016) for a critical discussion of this notion in 
the context of Frigg’s fictionalist proposal.
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imagined properties of model systems and the real 
properties of targets can only be fictionally identical, 
or identical within a game of make-believe. That is, 
we can only have imagined identity. Exporting what 
we have learned about the model system requires that 
we assume an external perspective (either implicitly 
or explicitly) and state that this is how things are 
described in the model and then claim that this is 
also how things are (hypothetically) in the relevant 
physical system. Thus, an interpretation key is noth-
ing other than a principle of exportation that needs to 
take into consideration the original fictional nature 
of the facts that are fictionally identical to those of 
the relevant target. The key enables to export an f-fact 
about imaginary populations and rates of increase and 
decrease of population size, as described according to 
the model, outside of the game of make-believe into 
a claim about a real corresponding fact about real 
populations. It is by generating these direct attribu-
tions that we can achieve genuine scientific discov-
ery: after a plausible hypothesis has been generated 
through the imagination via the constraints imposed 
by the model description, we can test the relevant 
hypothesis in reality to gain genuine knowledge of 
real world phenomena.
Simple fictionalism: The model description DM prescribes imagining a certain propositional content CM, which is composed of the
primary f-truths of the model and the implied f-truths generated through the principles of generation PG. The information generated 
through the original prescriptions to imagine and the principles of generation is stored in a mental file F and taken to be, internally, 
about a model system SM. There is, however, no model system. The model M, constituted by DM and CM, stands in the representation 
relation with the target T. This representation relation involves two different conditions, AC (the aboutness condition) and EC 
(the epistemic condition), that need to be satisfied for M to be a representation that enables scientific discovery and thereby knowledge about T.
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5  Conclusions
In this paper I developed simple fictionalism as a novel 
account of scientific models as epistemic representations 
that enable scientific discovery. In doing this, I drew on Wal-
ton’s influential theory of fiction as a game of make-believe. 
Following previous work done with Roman Frigg, I inter-
preted make-believe as a form of propositional imagination 
constrained by prescriptions to imagine and domain specific 
principles of generation. I advanced an explanation of AC 
starting from the identification of models as complex objects 
constituted by model descriptions (the props) and their con-
tent (a set of fictional propositions) and I argued that they 
are the vehicles of denotation. I explained EC in terms of the 
generation of theoretical hypotheses, i.e. model-world com-
parisons and direct attributions. The upshot is that scientific 
models can lead to genuine scientific discovery when they 
are used as representations that stand in a genuine denotation 
relation with the world and generate plausible hypotheses 
through make-believe.
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